I can see (imagine?) the threads of national governmental character in each. The UK seems riven in most matters and is in a phase of being brutal to its -admittedly, mediocre these last few decades - leaders. Australia is unwilling to eyeball its past in any domain. And good old New Zealand will favour a focus on doing over thinking - be it reflective or prospective - every time.
However, that aside, my first reaction to this was to consider how I'd frame any such review. Where would my bias direct my attention?
Given the lockdown mandates were some of the baldest uses of the state's monopoly on force in a generation, for many of us, I tend to start with that. And I am reminded of military ethics and the four tests:
* jus ad bellum - is it morally just to enter into war/apply force at all
* jus in bello - is the way you intend to use force morally just
* jus ex bello - is the way you intend to end the use of force morally just, and
* jus post bellum - is the way you intend to organise the post intervention order morally just.
It seems the Johnson administration is condemned for inadequacy at the first hurdle or two. The Ardern administration receives its criticism largely in respect of perceived failures in the latter two especially.
I am also reminded of the notion of ethical triangulation: first applying a deontological assessment to discern the principled approach; then testing that against its consequences; and finally assessing whether the apparent course of action is really what a virtuous person would do or is more the consequence of some other distortionary factor.
I rather expect that New Zealand's choices were driven from a purely consequentialist view, albeit marketed under the brands of the virtuous characters of the PM and the DG of Health. Still, even that narrow a base seems to have proven better than the apparent absence of even a consequentialist lens to guide Australia and the UK in their opening gambits.
🤷 But surely in some wise each got the one they needed/deserved ⁉️ The UK response WAS a failure in terms of lives lost, systems overwhelmed, etc etc so there IS someone to "hold accountable" for politically bad decision making 🤔 Australia did better than the UK but worse than Aotearoa (by international standards) & they DO have this federal v state tension that makes things more challenging in something like a global pandemic. Aotearoa was world-leading in terms of outcomes - leadership made generally positive decisions in terms of avoiding loss of life & health system overwhelm, & even economically, so "accountable" &/or lack of co-ordination between legislative entities not relevant (leaving aside non-govt agencies like Maori/Pacifica which absolutely needed improvement)
The UK neither had an indigenous operative Treaty partner & statistically more vulnerable Maori/Pacifica population on top of the elderly/immune compromised, nor practical tensions of state v federal. Australia also didn't have the indigenous Treaty partner complexities.
Interesting comparisons that go deeper than just the "Westminster system" commonality because everything else IMHO is apples, oranges, & bananas 🤗
You're right that the contexts are different, but I wonder if my point is not clear: I am not comparing pandemic responses. I am offering a view on what each Westminster-derived political culture can bear to confront, and what it chooses to look away from. I'm comparing the inquiries. I thought I had written a piece about what each nation has decided to examine when it came time to remember the crisis.
The UK chose a full Royal Commission with ten modules. Today's report is the second of what will be at least ten reports, and the research into societal impact: short-and long-term is sophisticated and profound. Module 10 is specifically dedicated to "Impact on society." Australia chose an independent inquiry rather than a Royal Commission and focused on rebuilding trust rather than assigning accountability. Aotearoa has, frankly, so far deferred examining the medium-and longer-term impacts of our response: ie, economic costs, social cohesion, and what lockdowns actually did to people and communities. The Phase One inquiry focused on machinery and process, not on the more complicated questions about state power, proportionality and what might have been lost. Royal commissions are part of the policy advisory system, and our inquiry is being used to refine the machinery in the short term, rather than to examine what it did in the medium and long term.
We can agree to disagree that our response was successful; maybe, yes, in the short-term, but medium and long-term, maybe not. Social license for the second lockdown crumbled incredibly quickly, which is what I am researching. I am not unbiased; I speak as someone who spent their time working for Iwi, Hapū and Whānau organisations to implement the government's policies during the first and second lockdowns, who had whānau who lost businesses during the regional lockdowns, and who completed peer-reviewed, published research on the vaccination rollout. So I probably approach these questions less as black-and-white and more as questions about how they affected the role and legitimacy of state action in an ongoing emergency. But I will continue to explore them, regardless of whether some think these questions are unnecessary given our world-leading response.
P.S.: I tend to sit in the Zhou Enlai camp on most things: when asked what he thought of the French Revolution, he reportedly said it was ‘too early to tell.’ In relation to the signing of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, I’d say the same: the consequences are still unfolding across our constitutional settings, in the Crown–Māori relationship, and everyday practice so that any final judgement would be premature. And given the pandemic only happened five years ago, I’m definitely saying the same thing there too: we are still living through its very long tail, so it’s far too soon to offer a settled and final verdict. x
I can see (imagine?) the threads of national governmental character in each. The UK seems riven in most matters and is in a phase of being brutal to its -admittedly, mediocre these last few decades - leaders. Australia is unwilling to eyeball its past in any domain. And good old New Zealand will favour a focus on doing over thinking - be it reflective or prospective - every time.
However, that aside, my first reaction to this was to consider how I'd frame any such review. Where would my bias direct my attention?
Given the lockdown mandates were some of the baldest uses of the state's monopoly on force in a generation, for many of us, I tend to start with that. And I am reminded of military ethics and the four tests:
* jus ad bellum - is it morally just to enter into war/apply force at all
* jus in bello - is the way you intend to use force morally just
* jus ex bello - is the way you intend to end the use of force morally just, and
* jus post bellum - is the way you intend to organise the post intervention order morally just.
It seems the Johnson administration is condemned for inadequacy at the first hurdle or two. The Ardern administration receives its criticism largely in respect of perceived failures in the latter two especially.
I am also reminded of the notion of ethical triangulation: first applying a deontological assessment to discern the principled approach; then testing that against its consequences; and finally assessing whether the apparent course of action is really what a virtuous person would do or is more the consequence of some other distortionary factor.
I rather expect that New Zealand's choices were driven from a purely consequentialist view, albeit marketed under the brands of the virtuous characters of the PM and the DG of Health. Still, even that narrow a base seems to have proven better than the apparent absence of even a consequentialist lens to guide Australia and the UK in their opening gambits.
Nice Pete. I like the ethic-of-force framing, especially jus ex bello / jus post bellum.
🤷 But surely in some wise each got the one they needed/deserved ⁉️ The UK response WAS a failure in terms of lives lost, systems overwhelmed, etc etc so there IS someone to "hold accountable" for politically bad decision making 🤔 Australia did better than the UK but worse than Aotearoa (by international standards) & they DO have this federal v state tension that makes things more challenging in something like a global pandemic. Aotearoa was world-leading in terms of outcomes - leadership made generally positive decisions in terms of avoiding loss of life & health system overwhelm, & even economically, so "accountable" &/or lack of co-ordination between legislative entities not relevant (leaving aside non-govt agencies like Maori/Pacifica which absolutely needed improvement)
The UK neither had an indigenous operative Treaty partner & statistically more vulnerable Maori/Pacifica population on top of the elderly/immune compromised, nor practical tensions of state v federal. Australia also didn't have the indigenous Treaty partner complexities.
Interesting comparisons that go deeper than just the "Westminster system" commonality because everything else IMHO is apples, oranges, & bananas 🤗
Hi Cindy,
You're right that the contexts are different, but I wonder if my point is not clear: I am not comparing pandemic responses. I am offering a view on what each Westminster-derived political culture can bear to confront, and what it chooses to look away from. I'm comparing the inquiries. I thought I had written a piece about what each nation has decided to examine when it came time to remember the crisis.
The UK chose a full Royal Commission with ten modules. Today's report is the second of what will be at least ten reports, and the research into societal impact: short-and long-term is sophisticated and profound. Module 10 is specifically dedicated to "Impact on society." Australia chose an independent inquiry rather than a Royal Commission and focused on rebuilding trust rather than assigning accountability. Aotearoa has, frankly, so far deferred examining the medium-and longer-term impacts of our response: ie, economic costs, social cohesion, and what lockdowns actually did to people and communities. The Phase One inquiry focused on machinery and process, not on the more complicated questions about state power, proportionality and what might have been lost. Royal commissions are part of the policy advisory system, and our inquiry is being used to refine the machinery in the short term, rather than to examine what it did in the medium and long term.
We can agree to disagree that our response was successful; maybe, yes, in the short-term, but medium and long-term, maybe not. Social license for the second lockdown crumbled incredibly quickly, which is what I am researching. I am not unbiased; I speak as someone who spent their time working for Iwi, Hapū and Whānau organisations to implement the government's policies during the first and second lockdowns, who had whānau who lost businesses during the regional lockdowns, and who completed peer-reviewed, published research on the vaccination rollout. So I probably approach these questions less as black-and-white and more as questions about how they affected the role and legitimacy of state action in an ongoing emergency. But I will continue to explore them, regardless of whether some think these questions are unnecessary given our world-leading response.
Thanks for your comment. x
P.S.: I tend to sit in the Zhou Enlai camp on most things: when asked what he thought of the French Revolution, he reportedly said it was ‘too early to tell.’ In relation to the signing of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, I’d say the same: the consequences are still unfolding across our constitutional settings, in the Crown–Māori relationship, and everyday practice so that any final judgement would be premature. And given the pandemic only happened five years ago, I’m definitely saying the same thing there too: we are still living through its very long tail, so it’s far too soon to offer a settled and final verdict. x